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This paper shows that the positive correlation between the pres-
ence of institutional investors and a ﬁrm’s likelihood of being ac-
quired is due to ownership endogeneity, i.e., due to the fact that
institutions are better informed investors. After controlling for this
ownership endogeneity, the presence of institutional investors re-
duces the probability of being acquired. There is also evidence that
mutual funds or funds with high turnover rates are more likely to
beneﬁt from selective disclosure prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure.
The presence of public pension funds increases the announcement
premium that targets receive.
1Introduction
The role of institutional investors in the takeover market’s selection of targets is quite ambigu-
ous. It is diﬃcult to distinguish a selection eﬀect from an inﬂuence eﬀect. Many researchers
have shown that institutional investors have selection ability around corporate events. For
example, Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan (1993), Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000), and
others, have documented that ﬁnancial analysts (hired by institutions) have expertise to
process and interpret information. Bailey, Li, Mao, and Zhong (2003), Jorion, Liu, and Shi
(2005), and many others argue that institutions have informational advantage from selective
disclosures.
On the other hand, institutions are often believed to be able to inﬂuence the acquisition
likelihood, yet opinions on their exact roles also diﬀer. Some (Brickley, Lease, and Smith
(1988), Jarrell and Poulsen (1987), Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001), Gorton and Kahl (2006),
etc.) believe that large shareholdings of institutions facilitate a takeover eﬀort either through
block selling or through the removal of anti-takeover measures. The implication is that higher
institutional ownership may be correlated with larger probability of being acquired. Others
(Jensen and Meckling (1976), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Admati, Pﬂeiderer, and Zechner
(1994), etc.) believe that institutions with substantial equity stakes can carry out a monitor’s
role. In so far as the takeover market serves as a market disciplinary force, higher institutional
ownership may reduce the likelihood of being acquired due to monitoring beneﬁts.
Given that institutional ownership and corporate events such as a takeover are often
jointly determined, any study trying to identify an institutional inﬂuence on corporate de-
cisions needs to control for this ownership endogeneity. This study relies on a “Bartik”
2instrument (Bartik (1991), Blanchard and Katz (1992)) to identify the exogeneous varia-
tions in institutional ownership, and thus is able to identify the exact institutional inﬂuence.
Ex ante, there are two possible sources of institutional selection ability, and two possible
directions of institutional inﬂuence. We ﬁnd that mutual funds and funds with high turnover
rates are most likely to beneﬁt from selective disclosures. We also ﬁnd that the direction of
institutional inﬂuence is mostly to reduce the likelihood of being acquired, which supports
a monitoring story. There is also evidence that high turnover institutions may facilitate a
take-over eﬀort and increase the probability of being acquired.
To distinguish between the two sources of selection ability, we explore the natural exper-
iment of the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on October 13, 2000. Regulation FD prohibits public companies from giving
non-public material information to favored investment professionals. It requires that com-
panies that intentionally disclose material information to a selected group of shareholders
should disclose it to the public simultaneously. If institutional investors were beneﬁciaries of
selective disclosure prior to the adoption of Regulation FD, we would observe a discontinuity
in the relation between their share-holdings and the likelihood of being acquired. Following
this logic, we examine the data in the four years prior to FD (1997-2000), and in the four
years post FD (2001-2004). Our results are robust to a longer time horizon prior to FD
(1980-2000).
We are able to observe this discontinuity for mutual funds and for institutional investors
with a high turnover rate. Before the adoption of Regulation FD, one standard deviation
increase of mutual fund holdins is correlated with an increase in the target likelihood by 20
3basis points. Give that the ex post probability of being acquired in the four years before the
adoption of FD is 1.46%, this increase is not trivial. Furthur more, this positive relationship
no longer exists for mutual funds and high turnover institutions post the adoption of FD.
The results on the direction of institutional inﬂuence is quite interesting. When we look at
the holding levels of institutional investors, there is a clear negative inﬂuence after controlling
for ownership endogeneity. However, when we look at the turnover rate of institutions, there
is a positive eﬀect. It appears that institutions with high turnover rates are the group that
facilitates bidders’ takeover eﬀort by providing their shares.
To asertain whether institutions have a monitoring eﬀect on potential targets, we examine
the relation between institutional ownership and the target announcement premium. We ﬁnd
that public pension funds’ (PPF) ownership increases the target premium. For one standard
deviation increase in PPF ownership, the target announcement abnormal return increases by
2%, controlling for ﬁrm performances. It seems that the market is expecting those targets
to be able to negotiate a better deal at settlement.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a literature review.
Section II describes the speciﬁcation and the identiﬁcation strategy. Section III describes
data. Section IV discuss institutional ownership impact on target likelihood and target
premium. Section V concludes the paper.
I Literature Review
There is a large literature looking into institutional investors’ corporate governance activity in
the goal of identifying any potential inﬂuence. The early literature focuses on institutions’
4activity in submitting proxy proposals. For example, Gillan and Starks (2000) report a
positive relation between holdings by institutional investors and the aggregate votes for
shareholder-sponsored governance proposals. Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) ﬁnd that
the pension funds are more successful at monitoring and promoting changes in the ﬁrms
they target their activism at. Other studies examine institutions’ non-proxy activity, such
as their impact on compensation policy, CEO turnover, and market response to corporate
event. Hartzell and Starks (2003) show that institutional ownership is positively related
to the pay performance sensitivity of the executive compensation and negatively related
to the level of the compensation. Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) ﬁnds the change in
institutional ownership holdings is negatively related to the likelihood of CEO turnover,
and the institutional investors voted with their feet by selling their shares in the year prior
to the forced CEO turnover. Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003) ﬁnd that the stock price
response is more negative for ﬁrms with higher level of institutional ownership, when ﬁrms
reported earnings below the analyst’s expectation. Other papers such as Karpoﬀ, Malatesta,
and Walkling (1996) and Wahal (1996), Song and Szewczyk (2003) show that there is very
little evidence of the eﬃcacy of shareholder activism, or that the shareholder proposals have
negligible eﬀect on the corporate performance.
Some papers are speciﬁcally related to the corporate control activity and institutional
investors. Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) and Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) ﬁnd that ﬁrms
with higher levels of institutional investors are more likely to vote against the adoption
of the Antitakeover Charter Amendements, or are less likely to adopt it. On the other
hand, Pound (1988) shows that institutional investors act as managements’ allies in proxy
5contests. Ambrose and Megginson (1992) ﬁnds that the probability of receiving a takeover
bid is negatively related to the net change of institutional holdings, while the absolute level
of the institutional holding has no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on receiving a takeover bid. A more
recent work by Davis and Kim (2006) ﬁnd that mutual funds with more business ties are
less likely to vote against the management in general.
The diﬃculty in identifying the exact institutional investor inﬂuence is due to the fact
that it is hard to control for ownership endogeneity, i.e., to control for the fact that the
institutional investors are better investors and have better information, as documented by a
large literature.
Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan (1993) and Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000), and
many others have shown that institutions have better skills than individual investors and
hence can process better information. Others document that institutions information ad-
vantage comes from better disclosure they receive from ﬁrms. Gibson, Saﬁeddine, and Sonti
(2004) document that the selection ability of the institutional investors to identify SEOs
with better performance could be attributed to the beneﬁts of selective disclosure. Bailey,
Li, Mao, and Zhong (2003), Jorion, Liu, and Shi (2005), and others ﬁnd support that SEC’s
Regulation Fair Disclosure enacted on October 13, 2000 reduces the selective disclosure to
some shareholders.
6II Speciﬁcation and Identiﬁcation Strategy
The structural equation is:
yit = β0 + β1InstOwnershipit−1 + φXit + γY eart + ui + it, (1)
where yit, the dependent variable, is a dummy variable. It equals one for the quarter
when there is at least one announcement of the ﬁrm being a merger target, which was
completed successfully later on. t is a quarterly time subscript. An i denotes each ﬁrm.
ui is the ﬁrm-level eﬀect. The ownership variables InstOwnershipit−1 (Total Institutional
Ownership, Public Pension Funds, Investment Companies, Others, the turnover rate of the
institutional investors) are the variables of interest in this study, and they are ownership
measures at the end of the prior quarter. The Xit is a vector of control variables including
ﬁrm size, q ratio, cash ﬂow ratio, capital expenditures ratio, ﬁrm prior performance in the
prior quarter measured as average daily excess return, return volatility, liquidity, dividend
yield, average sales growth over prior three years, and leverage ratio averaged over three
years. Table I explains in detail what these variables are. The Y earts are year dummies.
Ownership endogeneity arises when institutions are able to predict future shocks to the
likelihood of being acquired, and adjust their ownership accordingly. Since it’s well docu-
mented that institutions are either smarter investors who have innate selection ability, or are
able to capitalize on selective disclosure of relavent information, this endogeneity problem is
quite likely to exist.
A “Bartik instrument” is employed to identify the institutional inﬂuence. The assumption
7of this approach is that a given institution’s portfolio size is exogenous. There are two factors
aﬀecting the fund size. One is the net inﬂow of funds. If individual investors can predict
future shocks, and can identify a particular fund as having the same predictive power, then
the fund ﬂow can be endogenous. However, there are few reasons to believe that an ordinary
individual investor possess this ability. Furthermore, the net inﬂows of pension funds are
determined by generally ﬁxed contributions of their members and their liabilities, which are
most likely exogenous. The second factor aﬀecting fund sizes is the performance of their
portfolio, which in turn is determined by the current stock price. M&A announcements are
often considered surprises. There may be rumors and trading activity in the couple of days
leading to an announcement. However, the market may not able to predict M&A activity
in an average time horizon of 45 days. Consequently, the current stock price most likely has
not incorporated the future shocks to the target likelihood. We also look into institutions’
portfolio sizes with a longer lag, up to 6 months. The results remain robust.
This Bartik instrument interacts the exogenous shocks to institutional investors’ portfolio
sizes with the ﬁrm-level propensity of investment, which is obtained as the ﬁxed eﬀects from
the following regression by each institutional investor j:
InstOwnershipit = β0 + β1FundSizeit + ωi + eit (2)
ωi can be considered as j’s propensity to invest in ﬁrm i. It is not correlated with fu-
ture target likelihood shocks, which is captured by eit if instutional ownership is correlated
with this shock. ωi is ﬁrm speciﬁc, and does not vary across time. The institutional in-
vestor j’s portfolio size varies across time, but not across ﬁrm. The Bartik instrument is
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FundSizeit ∗ ωi. It interacts the two dimensions, and varies across both ﬁrm and time.
To check that this instrument is valid, I exam the F-statistics from the ﬁrst-stage IV
regressions. The F-stats are much greater than ten. It does not suﬀer weak instrument
problem (Staiger and Stock (1997)).
III Data
The initial sample is the overlap between CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases from 1997
to 2004. Corporate ﬁnancial information is obtained from COMPUSTAT and stock perfor-
mance data is from CRSP. The sample is limited to securities identiﬁed by CRSP as ordinary
common shares (with share codes 11 or 12). This excludes American Depository Receipts,
closed-end-funds, primes and scores, and Real Estate Investment Trusts. Utilities, ﬁnance
and insurance companies, and government agencies (2-digit SIC code 49, from 60 to 69,
and above 89) are also excluded. There are a total of 8,494 ﬁrms, and a total of 157,726
ﬁrm-quarter observations.
Merger target information is obtained from the SDC domestic M&A database by Thom-
son Financial. To be included, a deal has to be completed with 100% of the target acquired
by the bidder, and is classiﬁed by SDC as a “merger”. Since we cannot obtain institutional
ownership information for private ﬁrms, only deals with public targets are included. There
is a total of 1,887 announcement quarters, about 1.2% of the total ﬁrm-quarter observations.
Table II provides detailed information on this set of announcement. Table III shows that
across the eight years of study, more targets were acquired before the adoption of Regulation
FD. This is mostly likely due to events post Regulation FD, such as the busting of the IT
9bubble, the tragedy on Sept. 11, 2001, which bring a climate change in the macroeconomy
and slow down the M&A market. Thus in our analysis we include a dummy controlling for
this broad shift in addition to the year dummies.
The institutional ownership data is obtained from Thomson Financial.1 I identify public
pension funds by their names in the Thomson database. In total I ﬁnd 15 public pension
funds:2 California public employees retirement system (CalPERS), California state teachers
retirement system, Colorado public employees retirement association, Florida state board
of administration, Kentucky teachers retirement system, Michigan state treasury, Montana
board of investment, New Mexico educational retirement board, New York state common
retirement fund, New York state teachers retirement system, Ohio public employees re-
tirement system, Ohio school employees retirement system, Ohio state teachers retirement
system, Virginia retirement system, and State of Wisconsin investment board. At the end
of June 2000, the average size of equity assets under management is $25.17 billion, and
the median is $24.65 billion (the largest fund is CalPERS [$63.53 billion], the smallest is
New Mexico educational retirement board [$1.51 billion]). My results remain the same if
CalPERS, the most visible activist fund, is excluded. About 2% of the observations have
zero PPF ownership. The mutual fund ownership is what Thomson classiﬁed as investment
company ownership. The rest are classiﬁed as other institutional ownership. The aggregate
holdings by each category are used to measure institutional ownerships.
1Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Rule 13f), institutional investment managers who exercise
investment discretion over accounts with publicly traded securities (section 13(f) securities) and who hold
equity portfolios exceeding $100 million are required to ﬁle Form 13f within 45 days after the last day of
each quarter. Investment managers must report all holdings in excess of 10,000 shares and/or with a market
value over $200,000.
2Not all state and local pension funds holdings are available, because either they are too small and do
not ﬁle 13f, or their assets are reported by outside money managers.
10Table IV shows the summary statistics of the dataset. The median market capitalization
is $137.03 million and the mean is $1,963.59 million. Thus this dataset is not dominant by
large ﬁrms. Out of the total of 157,726 ﬁrm-quarter observations, 1.20% are target ﬁrm-
quarter ones. A total of 5,427 observations have zero institutional ownership, and 1.03% of
those are target ﬁrm-quarter observations.
IV Empirical Results
Table V examines the relation between institutional holdings and the likelihood of being
acquired. Apart from looking at the overall institutional ownership, we also break it down
into diﬀerent types of institutional investors. The literature in law and economics (Black
(1990), Roe (1994), etc.) has argued that there are substantial heterogeneity among diﬀerent
types of institutional investors regarding monitoring incentives and activities. The most
interesting classiﬁcations may be public pension funds and mutual funds. Many (Black
(1990), Gillan and Starks (2000), etc.) have argued that public pension funds are the most
likely monitors of corporate governance. On the other hand, Davis and Kim (2006) ﬁnd that
mutual funds with more business ties are more likely to vote with the management, using the
recently available mutual fund proxy voting records. Thus we break the overall institutional
ownership into three types: public pension funds, mutual funds, and all others.
Equations (1) through (6) in Table V are ﬁxed eﬀect regressions. We ﬁnd that institu-
tional ownership is positively associated with ﬁrms’ likelihood of being acquired throughout
the sample. This association is stronger prior to the adoption of Regulation FD. Upon ex-
amination of diﬀerent types of institutions, it is clear that the stronger association before
11FD is entirely driven by mutual fund ownership. In the regressions, we control for both the
level of institutional ownership and the Regulation FD dummy which equals one for years
before FD. The interaction term between mutual fund ownership and the time dummy is
analogous to “diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence”. It compares the diﬀerence in correlation before and
after Regulation FD for those ﬁrms with high mutual fund ownership with the diﬀerence for
those with low mututal fund ownership. It tells us the extra ”eﬀect” mutual fund ownership
has prior to 2001.
A one standard deviation increase in mutual fund ownership before the adoption of
Regulation FD is correlated with an increase of 14 to 20 basis points in the probability of
being acquired. Since the ex post target likelihood in that period is 1.46%, this absolute
increase translates into a 10% to 14% relative reduction. Post Regulation FD, mutual fund
ownership is no longer positively associated with target likelihood, while public pension
funds and other institutional ownership are still positively associated with the likelihood. A
similar pattern is also found for institutional investors with high turnover rates. We conclude
that mutual funds and institutions which trade prequently are the most likely candidates to
beneﬁt from the selective disclosure prior to Regulation FD. Other institutions exhibit some
skills in picking the potential targets.
Equations (7) to (12) in Table V are ﬁxed eﬀect IV regressions. We can give their
coeﬃcients a clearer interpretation in terms of the causality. Contrary to the theoretical
interpretation that higher institutional ownership facilitates takeover and thus increase the
probability of being acquired, the higher level of all types of institutions leads to smaller
target likelihood, after controlling for ﬁrm characteristics, ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, and year ﬁxed
12eﬀects. The silver lining of this argument is that a higher average turnover rate of a given
ﬁrm’s institutional investors leads to larger probability of being acquired. This seems to
suggest that the role of facilitating takeover eﬀorts is mostly taken by institutions who trade
very frequently.
We also control for relevant ﬁrm characteristics in the regressions following existing lit-
erature. Palepu (1986) and Jensen and Ruback (1983) conclude that it is diﬃcult to predict
targets. We conﬁrm their opinion as few variables are signiﬁcant. Furthermore, the ﬁrm
characteristics variables can be endogenous themselves. There can be a confounding factor
which inﬂuences both variables like ﬁrm size and q ratio, etc., and the shocks to the like-
lihood of being acquired. Since these variables are not the main interest of this paper, we
leave the task of ﬁnding the causality between ﬁrm characteristics and target likelihood for
future research.
One variable that is interesting to mention is the Regulation FD dummy. It is equal one
for years 1997 to 2000, which are prior to the adoption of the regulation. The last quarter
of 2000 is in fact post the adoption, since we are looking into the institutional ownership
at the end of the prior quarter, we classify this quarter as before FD. The ﬁrst quarter of
2001 could be problematic, as the change in the institutional ownership in the prior quarter
could happen before the adoption of the regulation. Whether we classify this as before
FD or after FD, or drop it from the sample, does not make any material changes. This
FD dummy is signiﬁcantly negative across all speciﬁcations. Although the actual number
of target announcement is fewer in the second half of the sample, 612 announcement from
2001 to 2004 comparing to 1,275 announcement from 1997 to 2000, in the counter-factual,
13if we could hold all other things, such as ﬁrm characteristics, constant between the two
sub-samples, there would be more target announcements in the second half. This suggets
that the barrier to acquire or getting acquired actually was lower post FD, even though the
absolute number of announcement is much smaller.
The negative eﬀect institutional ownership has on the likelihood of being acquired can
be due to two diﬀerent mechanisms. The ﬁrst one is a monitoring mechanism. Institutions
as large share holders can exercise a monitor’s role, and lead to better ﬁrm performance and
reduce the probability of ﬁrms falling prey of a bidder. The second one is a “friendship”
mechanism. It is possible that institutional investors side with the management and use their
shareholdings to help the management fend oﬀ potential takeover bids. This mechanism may
not lead to better ﬁrm values.
Although it is hard to distinguish between the two mechanisms using our current data,
we can do one test to see whether the institutional investors are representing shareholder
interest. Table VI examines the relation between institutional ownership and the target
announcement premium. After controlling for ownership endogeneity, deal characteristics,
ﬁrm characteristics, and year ﬁxed eﬀects, we ﬁnd that only public pension fund ownership
leads to higher target announcement abnormal returns. A one standard deviation increase
in PPF ownership leads to an increase of 2% in the announcement premium. It suggests
that the market expects those ﬁrms to be able to negotiate a better deal. This positive eﬀect
does not exist for other types of institutions.
14V Conclusions
The role of institutional investors in the market for takeover targets is much debated. We
explore the discontinuity created by the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure to identify
the source of institutional investors’ selection ability. We ﬁnd that while other institutions
exhibit some stock picking skills, mutual funds and institutions who trade more were most
likely beneﬁting from selective disclosure prior to the adoption of the regulation. We are
also able to identify the direction of institutional investor inﬂuence by using an IV technique.
Institutional investors are found to reduce the probability of ﬁrms’ being acquired. Among
them, public pension funds are able to increase the target announcement premium.
However, there are also many issues left for further research. First, ﬁrm characteristics
are used as control variables in this study. They can very well be endogenous. It is interesting
to ﬁnd the direction of causality for this set of variables. Second, the exact mechanism via
which institutions are able to reduce the target probability is worth exploring. Third, target
announcement abnormal returns can also be interpreted as the market expectation of the
value improvement through a takeover. If so, why the value improvement is larger for ﬁrms
with higher public pension funds? Is it because these ﬁrms are able to ﬁnd a better bidder,
or is it because these ﬁrms are very poorly wrong so there is larger room for improvement?
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20Table II: Deal characteristics
This table presents mean and median (in parentheses) of deal characteristics for the targets included in
our sample. The targets are recorded in the SDC mergers and acquisitions database (1997-2004). To be
included, each deal satisfy the following criteria: 1) domestic mergers; 2) deal status is completed; 3) classiﬁed
as mergers by SDC. self-tender oﬀer, repurchase and rumored deals are excluded; 4) acquirers and targets
both are public ﬁrms; 5) 100% of the target is acquired. For each company involved in the event, we request
that they also have information in CRSP and Compustat database. If we drop the ﬁfth criterion, results are
similar.
100% being acquired over 50% less than 100% being acquired
disclosed value undisclosed value disclosed value undisclosed value
Number of obs. 1861 26 102 0
Deal value 1,496.874 n/a 552.77 n/a
(million $) (233.6) 142.67
Days between announcement 112.50 153.27 131.91 n/a
and completion (96) (170.5) (125)
Days between the beginning of 46.33 47.23 45.65 n/a
the quarter and announcement (46) (50.50) 43
Hostile 0.01 0 0.03 n/a
dummy (0) (0) (0)
Tender oﬀer 0.28 0 0.51 n/a
dummy (0) (0) (1)
All cash deal 0.48 0 0.86 n/a
dummy (0) (0) (1)
21Table III: Deal distribution
This table presents the deal distribution for our sample years 1997-2004. This sample consists of CRSP and
COMPUSTAT ﬁrms issuing ordinary common shares, excluding utilities, ﬁnance and insurance companies
and government agencies. The total number of observations is reported in the second column. The number
of ﬁrm-quarter observations with M&A announcements for a public target is reported in the third column.









22Table IV: Descriptive Statistics
The sample consists of CRSP and COMPUSTAT ﬁrms (1997 – 2004) issuing ordinary common shares,
excluding utilities, ﬁnance and insurance companies and government agencies. The “Bartik” instru-
ment is the summation of the interactions between an institutional investor’s propensity to invest
in each ﬁrm and its portfolio size. Each institutional investor j’s propensity to invest in a ﬁrm i is
measured as ui, the ﬁrm-level ﬁxed eﬀect, from the following estimation by each institutional investor:
InstOwnershipit = α + βFundSizet + ui + eit.
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
Target Probabilty
Target dummy 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 1.00
Institutional Ownership
Aggregate public pension fund holdings 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.23
Aggregate investment company holdings 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.00 1.00
Aggregate other institutional holdings 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.00 1.00
Aggregate all institutional holdings 0.34 0.29 0.27 0.00 1.00
Bartik Instrument
Aggregate PPF 106.57 0.00 278.47 -546.37 4,904.75
Aggregate investment co. 4853.01 0.00 11,664.32 -16,035 113,963.30
Aggregate others 2,803.17 127.92 6,445.85 -8,665.05 94,251.52
Firm Characteristics
Total assets (millions) 1,543.82 133.44 10,795.24 0.00 647,483.00
Market capitalization (millions) 1,963.59 137.03 12,566.20 0.00 602,432.90
q ratio 2.55 1.48 5.28 0.00 485.57
Cash ﬂow ratio -0.06 0.06 0.92 −182.66 3.05
Capital expenditures ratio 0.07 0.04 0.10 -0.31 8.88
Leverage ratio 2.15 0.21 197.89 -804.88 25,187.39
Sales growth 0.70 0.11 28.24 −2.34 2,947.51
Dividend yield 0.01 0.00 0.62 −4.42 121.41
Daily excess return 0.00 0.00 0.01 −0.34 0.71
Return volatility 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.00 2.64



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25Table VI: Institutional Ownership and Target Announcement Premium
We report the coeﬃcients and standard errors from OLS regressions, and IV regressions. Target announce-
ment premium is the abnormal return during the (-1,1) three-day window. It is measured using a market
model. The market beta is measured during the (-260, -60) window.
Dependent variable — Target Premium
OLS IV




Public Pension 0.018 1.046***
(0.192) (0.357)







Before FD 0.001 0.002 -0.004 -0.014 -0.023 -0.006
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.018)
Tender oﬀer dummy 0.032* 0.032* 0.029 0.032* 0.028 0.038*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
All cash dummy -0.021 -0.022 -0.024 -0.024 -0.017 -0.018
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Size 0.005 0.005 0.011*** 0.018* 0.015 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.012) (0.006)
q ratio 0.011** 0.011** 0.012** 0.012** 0.013** 0.011**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Cash ﬂow 0.065** 0.066** 0.067** 0.069** 0.075** 0.065**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.030)
Capital expenditure -0.076 -0.076 -0.076 -0.092 -0.080 -0.096
(0.074) (0.074) (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
Excess return 49.195***49.190***49.052***48.861***48.571***49.101***
(2.886) (2.905) (2.875) (2.861) (2.899) (2.892)
Return volatility -0.083 -0.081 -0.108 -0.141 -0.169 -0.099
(0.081) (0.081) (0.080) (0.092) (0.104) (0.080)
Liquidity 0.071 0.071 0.083 0.105 0.108 0.086
(0.063) (0.063) (0.060) (0.066) (0.066) (0.060)
Dividend yield 0.080 0.077 0.030 0.008 0.049 0.106
(0.247) (0.246) (0.244) (0.247) (0.251) (0.252)
Sales growth 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Obs 1,322 1,322 1,322 1,322 1,322 1,322
R-squared 0.672 0.672 0.671 0.665 0.656 0.664
* signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 10%; ** signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 5%; *** signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 1%
26